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Three developments have created challenges for political repre-
sentation in the U.S. and particularly for the use of territorially
based representation (election by district). First, the demographic
complexity of the U.S. population has grown both in absolute
terms and in terms of residential patterns. Second, legal develop-
ments since the 1960s have recognized an increasing number of
groups as eligible for voting rights protection. Third, the growing
technical capacities of computer technology, particularly Geo-
graphic Information Systems, have allowed political parties and
other organizations to create election districts with increasingly
precise political and demographic characteristics. Scholars have
made considerable progress in measuring and evaluating the racial
and partisan biases of districting plans, and some states have tried
to use Geographic Information Systems technology to produce
more representative districts. However, case studies of Texas and
Arizona illustrate that such analytic and technical advances have
not overcome the basic contradictions that underlie the American
system of territorial political representation.
redistricting  gerrymandering  geographic information systems
Redistricting is a critical political issue, because differentelection district configurations create different electoral
outcomes. Placing voters into districts strongly affects the bal-
ance of power between political parties and the relative power of
ethnic-racial and political minorities. Redistricting can thus be a
powerful tool for political manipulation.
In this article, I first describe the basic process of redistricting
and its exploitation through the practice of gerrymandering. I
then review the major theoretical conflicts underlying this
system of political representation in the U.S. The use of districts
to elect state and congressional representatives involves at least
two sets of conflicting principles. First, districts must represent
both an agglomeration of individuals (or individual voters) and
unique regional communities. Second, the election system is
expected both to divide political factions among districts (to
encourage compromise and political moderation) and to provide
representation to distinct communities of interest (which typi-
cally share political goals). I next turn to the legal context of
political representation, describing how efforts to expand the
franchise to racial and ethnic minorities have raised a host of
questions about how to define, identify, and regulate gerryman-
dering. In the final section, I use case studies of Texas and
Arizona to examine the use of Geographic Information Systems
(GIS) and independent redistricting commissions to limit ger-
rymandering.
The inherent conflicts within U.S. political representation
mean that both legal regulations and technological solutions to
gerrymandering have met with limited success. Many of these
issues are not new, but the increasing diversity of the electorate
and the increased technical ability to shape voting constituencies
mean that these questions of political representation have taken
on special urgency.
Redistricting
American politicians have used redistricting strategically for
nearly 200 years (1), but the practice has attracted renewed
interest and criticism in the last 30 years and particularly since
1990. Census blocks or voting precincts are typically the basic
units used to construct districts. In the 2001 round of redistrict-
ing, for example, Texas used 8,285 precincts and 675,062 census
blocks to create 32 congressional districts, 31 state senate
districts, and 150 state house districts (2). GIS technology is a
particularly useful tool for redistricting, because it can display
and manipulate demographic and political data associated with
each block or precinct and rapidly analyze the effect of different
district configurations on expected election results (3).
Although the rhetoric of redistricting often includes refer-
ences to ‘‘traditional districting principles,’’ these principles are
typically aspirational rather than descriptive, a statement of how
redistricting should be done, not an account of how it is done in
practice. The creation of Arizona’s Independent Redistricting
Commission (IRC) in 2000 illustrates an especially telling at-
tempt to both codify and use these aspirational principles to limit
abusive redistricting practices.
In the November 2000 election, voters in Arizona amended
their state constitution with Proposition 106. Now part of the
state’s constitution, the measure created the IRC to draw the
state’s congressional and legislative districts and decreed how
the commission would create districts (4). The IRC began with
equal-population districts in a ‘‘grid-like pattern across the
state,’’ to be modified only according to the following six
‘‘traditional’’ principles: (i) compliance with the Constitution
and the Voting Rights Act; (ii) equal population; (iii) compact
and contiguous districts; (iv) respect for communities of interest;
(v) use of visible features and existing political boundaries; and
(vi) political competitiveness. The first principle (i) reflects
federal legal requirements and is absolute, but the others are
followed only ‘‘to the extent practicable.’’
Proposition 106 also forbids the use of political data for the
initial phase of the drawing process in an effort to eliminate
partisan manipulation, although such data could be used to test
compliance with the requirements once the districts had been
drawn. The residence of incumbent candidates could not be
considered at any point in the process. These detailed Consti-
tutional instructions did not avert legal controversy: in 2004, a
state court overturned the plans drawn by the IRC, because the
districts were not deemed sufficiently competitive.
There are a number of lessons to be drawn from Arizona’s
experience, and I return to this example in the final section. The
controversy over Arizona’s districts may seem puzzling, because
Proposition 106’s six districting principles seem entirely reason-
able and perhaps even seem to offer a foolproof recipe for
‘‘good’’ redistricting. Nonetheless, inherent conflict among these
specific principles and among the more general principles un-
derlying American political representation explains why reforms
intended to curb redistricting abuses have so often failed.
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Certain reforms might be beneficial, but it is important to
understand why many apparently common-sensical proposals
often prove inadequate.
Gerrymandering
Gerrymandering refers to the manipulation of election district
boundaries to change the outcome of elections. Unfortunately,
there is no objective way to clearly distinguish gerrymandering
from the redistricting process itself, because elections using
districts almost always produce a ‘‘biased’’ result. That is, the
proportion of votes cast for a particular party (or by voters from
a particular racial group) rarely matches the proportion of
representatives elected from that party (or preferred by that
racial group) (5). Consequently, the judgment of what consti-
tutes a gerrymander is a political and legal decision rather than
a strictly scientific one.
A simple hypothetical example illustrates how a districting
system can produce a ‘‘biased’’ result, even without deliberate
effort. Imagine a county that contains a city with 40% of the
area’s population and suburbs containing the remaining 60%.
The county commission consists of 10 representatives elected
from 10 districts, each containing 10% of the county’s popula-
tion. Furthermore, imagine that 90% of the city’s voters are
Democrats, whereas only 40% of suburban voters are registered
Democrats. (For the purpose of the example, assume that voters
are spread uniformly in the 90:10 ratio within the city and
uniformly in the 40:60 ratio in the suburbs.)
A ‘‘neutral’’ but naive redistricter might begin by drawing four
urban districts and six suburban ones. Such districts would fulfill
most, if not all, ‘‘traditional districting principles’’: They would
have equal populations, they would respect traditional political
boundaries (the municipal–suburban division), and they would
(presumably) be compact and contiguous. Indeed, one might
draw such plan without any reference to partisan information
like the number of voters registered in each party in each district.
Nonetheless, such a plan does not produce a proportional result.
Although 60% of the county’s voters are Democratic, only 40%
of the county’s representatives will be from districts with Dem-
ocratic majorities (see Table 1).
This example illustrates one of the ways that the geographic
concentration of voters can affect how votes translate into seats.
Certain geographic distributions can produce electoral advan-
tages, even under a ‘‘neutral’’ districting process, because they
distribute votes efficiently (6, 7). In particular, a distribution that
creates the maximum number of districts with relatively safe
majorities (typically 55–60%), without packing any district ex-
cessively, tends to create a real advantage.
In the actual redistricting process, the number of districts with
Democratic or Republican majorities is merely constrained,
rather than determined, by the distribution of voters. In the
above illustration, for example, one could easily create a pro-
portional plan by drawing districts that crossed the city–
suburban boundary to produce six Democratic-majority districts.
A truly partisan gerrymander might create 10 districts with
Democratic majorities by cleverly distributing Democratic voters
in 10 city–suburban districts. In contrast, the two parties might
agree on a bipartisan gerrymander that protects incumbent
representatives andor that gives each party five ‘‘safe’’ districts
with large partisan majorities. Alternatively, one could also draw
a plan with three safe districts for each party and four ‘‘com-
petitive’’ districts that a candidate from either party had an equal
chance to win. Even the definition of a ‘‘competitive’’ district is
difficult, however, because incumbent representatives win re-
election much more easily than challengers (8, 9).
Theoretical Conflicts in American Political Representation
Beyond the problems associated with defining and measuring
gerrymandering, attempts to regulate such manipulations run
afoul of the fundamentally contradictory principles underlying
territorial representation. First, political representation in the
U.S. incorporates the representation of both individuals and
regional communities. Second, districts are expected both to
force compromises by preventing domination by political fac-
tions and to provide for the representation of unique community
interests.
Until the mid-1960s, there were few restrictions on how states
drew congressional and legislative districts. Aside from a few
isolated legal cases restricting overt racial discrimination, state
legislatures could redistrict as they pleased. Yet between the
1920s and 1960s, the problem of malapportionment (unequal
population among districts) became increasingly severe (10). As
rural areas lost population relative to cities during the first half
of the 20th century, rural legislators, who held the balance of
power in most state assemblies, either refused to redistrict
entirely or used redistricting to protect their own seats. Although
rural areas grew underpopulated relative to urban ones, they
retained the same number of representatives. By the early 1960s,
these imbalances were often severe, with some urban state
legislative districts containing 1,000 times the population of
rural ones (3, 10).
Rural legislators defended these imbalances by appealing to
the idea of regional representation. Districts represented the
political interests of unique areas, rather than a fixed population
or a fixed number of voters. Their opponents countered with the
theory of numeric representation. Malapportionment violated
the principle of equality and majority rule, because ballots cast
by voters in rural districts carried far more power than votes in
urban areas. From this perspective, legislators represent an
agglomeration of individual voters rather than regions or com-
munities. Although both arguments were politically self-serving,
neither is absurd on its face. The same tension between repre-
sentation by region and by population is enshrined in the federal
government’s split between the Senate and House of Represen-
tatives and was the subject of long-running debates in the 19th
century (11).
The Supreme Court ruled in 1964 that severe malapportion-
ment violates Constitutional principles of equality. The majority
opinion seemed to settle the argument decisively in favor of
numeric representation: ‘‘Legislators represent people, not trees
or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or
economic interests’’ (12). The Court strengthened the equal
population standard in a number of subsequent cases. Current
standards require justification of any population deviation for
congressional districts within a particular state, whereas legis-
lative districts can have deviations of up to 10%. (States often
design congressional plans to have zero population deviation to
avoid possible legal challenges over malapportionment, even
though census data are not 100% accurate.) Courts did not carry
the principle of numeric representation to its logical conclusion,
however, by requiring a system that defines voting constituencies
by creating lists of voters, regardless of their location.
The current redistricting process thus embodies a fundamental
contradiction between two theories of representation. Voting
constituencies are defined territorially, but they must contain
equal populations. Modern GIS help overcome the technical









City 40 90 4 of 4
Suburb 60 40 0 of 6
County 100 60 4 of 10
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challenge of this equal population requirement, but they do not
resolve the conflict between territorial and numeric represen-
tation. This means that every districting plan can be criticized for
failing to represent (regional) communities of interest, for
malapportionment, or for both.
Territorial representation must also accommodate a second
contradiction between American political traditions. In the
Federalist Papers, James Madison articulated the principle of
‘‘antifactionalism’’ to justify the creation of a large republic (13).
He argued that territorial representation ensures that no polit-
ical faction would control or dominate a district, because geo-
graphic variation would provide a mixture of political interests.
Successful candidates would need to appeal to two or more
factions, providing an incentive for political compromise. For
Madison, the capacity of districts to divide political groups was
one of their major advantages.
On the other hand, a federal system acknowledges that
different regions have different legitimate political interests. It
is a short logical step to argue that different communities
(whether or not these are regional) have distinct interests and
values that deserve representation in elected assemblies. This
issue becomes particularly acute when political minorities find
that their votes are completely submerged within a large con-
stituency. Consequently, contemporary conflicts over redistrict-
ing also embody the conflict between forcing compromise
(antifactionalism) and providing representation for distinct com-
munities of interest.
These two basic conflicts, between regional and numeric
representation and between antifactionalism and community
representation, are currently played out in the context of in-
creasing racial and ethnic diversity. Immigration and internal
migration have led to an increasingly heterogeneous population
and increasingly complex residential patterns. Insofar as political
interests are defined along lines of race and ethnicity and along
divisions associated with immigration, conflicts over political
representation have become increasingly complex as the U.S.
population has become increasing diverse.
GIS offer one solution to this complexity but have more often
served to exacerbate existing problems. Redistricting using GIS
can ‘‘mirror the mosaic’’ of racial and ethnic diversity, giving
each racial or ethnic group (or coalitions of minority groups)
local majorities in election districts (14). Conversely, the same
technology can be used to dilute the voting power of such groups
and frustrate their ability to elect candidates of their choice.
Either strategy can be characterized as gerrymandering, because
each favors one set of political principles over others.
The conflicts over political redistricting and representation
are driven not simply by the increasing demographic complexity
of the U.S. population but also by legal developments that
expanded the franchise beyond property-owning white males age
21 or older (15).†
Legal Developments in Political Representation
Three Constitutional amendments, coming at 50-year intervals,
have extended the right to vote directly. African American men
gained the right to vote (in principle) with the 15th Amendment
(1870), women with the 19th Amendment (1920), and 18- to
20-year olds with the 26th Amendment (1971). Although this
may appear to show a steady expansion of the right and ability
to vote, these amendments actually represent high points in the
expansion of the franchise, which also underwent considerable
contraction over the same period (15). Indeed, African Amer-
ican men were effectively disenfranchised by the end of the 19th
century, and blacks (men and women) did not regain the
effective right to vote until passage of the 24th Amendment
(1964), which forbid poll taxes, and the Voting Rights Act (1965),
with its broad set of protections.
The expansion of the franchise has made elected assemblies
more representative, but it has also changed what it means to be
‘‘representative.’’ Madison’s principal concern in the Federalist
Papers was agricultural and industrial interests, both controlled
by white male property owners. Madison’s antifactionalism
argument could treat political interests as literally disembodied,
not attached to any particular person or to people sharing
ascriptive characteristics (race, gender, etc.) The struggles to
expand the franchise, however, have brought new attention to
the idea of ‘‘descriptive representation’’ (16, 17). Under this
principle, a ‘‘representative’’ assembly connotes one that ‘‘looks
like’’ the population it represents. In the extreme, this view can
lead to rigid numerical quotas for each relevant social group.
Such questions over the definition of ‘‘representation’’ became
central points of conflict as courts interpreted the Voting Rights
Act, and Congress renewed and amended it after 1965.
The Voting Rights Act
The Voting Rights Act was one of the most important pieces of
legislation in the 20th century. Not only did it give African
Americans the effective right to vote, but it also fundamentally
shifted the balance of power between states and the federal
government. Congress renewed and amended the Act in 1970,
1975, and 1982, and it is due for renewal again in 2007. One of
the most notable amendments came in 1975, when Congress
extended the protections of the Act to include additional mi-
norities, notably Latinos, Asian Americans, and Native Ameri-
cans, on the basis of language.
The Act was a complex piece of legislation, but I will focus on
Section 5, which gave the federal Department of Justice over-
sight over any change to a voting ‘‘standard, practice, or proce-
dure.’’ A jurisdiction covered by Section 5 must demonstrate that
any change is not racially discriminatory. This provision became
increasingly controversial after 1969, when the Supreme Court
ruled that Section 5 covered the redistricting process (18). The
Court extended oversight to redistricting, because racial gerry-
mandering could have rendered African Americans’ new voting
rights largely meaningless by permanently submerging minority
voters in larger white electorates.
The shift in emphasis from access to the voting booth to voting
power underlies many of the current voting rights controversies.
Some commentators argue that this shift, although perhaps
understandable, is fundamentally misguided and leads to racial
quotas (19). Other scholars respond that the Voting Rights Act
established a broader meaning to the right to vote, one that
includes a right to representation (17). The Supreme Court has
come down somewhere between these positions, limiting dis-
tricting plans that either clearly dilute minority voting power or
that use race as the ‘‘predominant’’ consideration (20).
Racial Gerrymanders
The Department of Justice (through its Section 5 oversight
powers) and the courts have been used to challenging racial
gerrymanders since the late 1960s. Through the 1980s, plaintiffs
usually sought to overturn districting plans that minimized the
number of nonwhite-majority districts. In contrast, after 1991–
1992, plaintiffs in racial gerrymandering cases argued that states
had drawn an excessive number of such districts. Both types of
cases face similar problems, including the legal definition of a
racial gerrymander and the empirical identification of such
districts. Courts have reached a somewhat muddled set of legal
standards for drawing nonwhite-majority districts. Unlike the
equal population requirement, there is no clear baseline for
defining the correct level of minority representation. Although
†Strictly speaking, the critical issue is the diversity of voters rather than the diversity of the
population per se. Voting rights litigation considers total population, voting age popu-
lation, and voting age population by citizenship.


















proportionality could be used as an objective benchmark (where
the ‘‘correct’’ level of minority representation is reached when
the proportion of minority-preferred candidates in an assembly
equals the proportion in the population), Congress specifically
stated there is no right to proportionality when it renewed the
Act in 1982. Indeed, even without this statutory limitation,
achieving either racial or political proportionality using election
by districts is nearly impossible, because the proportion of votes
cast is rarely matched by the proportion of seats won (5).
Geographer Ron Johnston has long argued that the so-called
seat–vote mismatch is a fundamental effect of all district election
systems (21).
The Supreme Court first focused, in the 1990s, on the shape
of nonwhite-majority districts to identify racial gerrymanders.
Democratically controlled legislatures created districts with ex-
traordinarily irregular boundaries to avoid the tradeoff between
nonwhite-majority districts and partisan advantage (22). Local
jurisdictions also used convoluted boundaries to create separate
black- and Latino-majority districts in areas where these two
groups were relatively integrated (23). The Supreme Court
struck down such ‘‘bizarre’’ districts but never articulated an
objective standard for the shape of districts (20). By the middle
of the decade, however, the Court turned away from a focus on
shape to a standard based on the intentions behind redistricting
plans: A legislature may consider race (and may be required to
do so under the Voting Rights Act), but race cannot be the
‘‘predominant’’ consideration in a plan (24).
The Court revisited the issue on nonwhite-majority districts
again in 2003, ruling that states are not bound to recognize
minority voting power by creating or maintaining nonwhite-
majority districts (25). In the appropriate circumstances, states
may create districting plans with ‘‘influence’’ districts, where
nonwhites are substantial minorities and can strongly influence,
but not necessarily control, the election of candidates. This legal
ruling was preceded by empirical work that suggested that
nonwhites often need 50% to have a decisive influence on
elections (26), and that the creation of nonwhite-majority dis-
tricts can paradoxically reduce overall minority political power
(22, 27).
Political Gerrymanders
Political (or partisan) gerrymanders present a different set of
empirical and legal issues, although many of the same analytic
techniques are involved. Vote totals provide a direct measure of
a partisan gerrymander’s effect, but the key empirical questions
revolve around the effect of different districting plans on the
ratio between seats and votes and the way this ratio changes with
different vote totals (5, 28).
Scholars have developed several techniques for measuring the
responsiveness and partisan bias of district plans (6, 21), but
there is little scholarly consensus over the level of bias that
defines a gerrymander or an ‘‘unfair’’ plan (29, 30). As illustrated
by my hypothetical county districting problem above, variation in
the geographic distribution of voters means that simple propor-
tionality is rarely an adequate benchmark. Indeed, the seats–
votes relationship inherent in territorial election systems and
random variation in election results mean that measuring the
bias of a plan precisely remains a difficult technical challenge. In
a 2004 Supreme Court case, a fractured Court ruled there are
practically no statutory or Constitutional restrictions on the
political gerrymandering of congressional districts (31). Despite
considerable empirical attention to the question of partisan
gerrymandering, the Court argued there are no manageable
standards for evaluating such claims.
Without a clear legal definition and broadly accepted empir-
ical test for gerrymandering, the Department of Justice and the
courts use a variety of criteria and methods to identify racially
discriminatory districting. Consequently, scholars have devel-
oped several different strategies to identify gerrymanders. One
set of innovative but ultimately misguided approaches uses
computationally intensive methods to automatically draw a large
number of districting plans. The characteristics of these hypo-
thetical districts are used to establish the probability of creating
a districting plan with, for example, one or two nonwhite-
majority districts. The following example focuses on racial
gerrymandering, but the same technique can be applied to
partisan gerrymandering as well.
In one study of South Carolina, researchers created 10,000
districting plans (with 60,000 total districts) with algorithms
using ‘‘race-blind’’ criteria such as equal population (within 1%
deviation), compactness, and respect for county boundaries (32).
The authors used these plans to derive the probability that a
legislature would create a nonwhite-majority district without
taking race into account. In this instance, they concluded that a
black-majority district could be produced only through racial
consciousness, because none of the 10,000 computer-drawn
plans contained one.
This approach, although apparently objective and neutral,
actually privileges one set of political principles over another.
The algorithms used did not include, for example, municipal
borders. If African Americans are segregated by city–suburban
or suburban–suburban boundaries, randomly drawn districts
efface the community of interest that may be generated by such
municipal segregation. Although the technique could be easily
modified to address this specific limitation, such approaches
would always favor antifactionalism over communities of inter-
est, because, within the parameters set by the programmers, all
census blocks and tracts are completely interchangeable. One
might respond by adding ‘‘communities of interest’’ to the
database but, as I discuss below, this task has its own problems.
More broadly, such studies illustrate the difficulty of estab-
lishing a value-free approach to redistricting; political values are
built into the algorithms used to automatically generate district-
ing plans. To one degree or another, all redistricting technolo-
gies, including GIS, have such values and judgments built into
them.
GIS Technology in Political Redistricting
When GIS came into common use during the 1991 round of
redistricting, they were accompanied by considerable optimism
that they would rationalize and democratize the process.‡ Such
powerful desktop technology offered the promise of transpar-
ency, accessibility, and empowerment: Plans could be analyzed
quickly and efficiently, more groups would have the ability to
produce plans, and more groups could promote their plans
effectively.
Redistricting GIS have certainly provided some of these
advantages. Interest groups have adopted the technology and
sometimes made effective use of it. The Department of Justice
has also made extensive use of GIS and other computer tech-
nology to enforce the Voting Rights Act, and that process has
arguably helped to democratize political participation in the
South more generally (33). Nonetheless, I believe that political
parties have been the major benefactors of GIS technology.
Parties have achieved unprecedented control over the outcome
of elections by gaining the ability to create precise gerrymanders.
Moreover, even where states have made a genuine attempt to
expand the representation of interests in redistricting GIS,
organizational and bureaucratic practices introduce severe con-
straints, so that the use of GIS in redistricting has the counter-
intuitive result of limiting, rather than expanding, access to
‡I base my arguments in this section on50 interviews I conducted with staff members in
the Department of Justice, software vendors, legislators, and legislative staff members in
nine states in 2001–2003.
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political representation. Finally, even where states have made
use of new technology and have tried to eliminate partisan
manipulation, they have not overcome the fundamental contra-
dictions underlying American political representation.
Redistricting GIS and Partisan Control
Before the use of GIS (1981 and earlier), redistricting was done
by hand and was so labor-intensive that an organization or state
agency could produce only a limited number of plans. With GIS
(1991 and after), a single individual could produce thousands of
different plans and could use sophisticated spatial analyses to
find gerrymanders that distributed voters efficiently. Indeed, one
might say the speed and sophistication of redistricting GIS have
turned gerrymandering from an art into a science. This change
was manifested dramatically in Texas during the early 2000s (2).
In 2001, a closely divided Texas state legislature deadlocked
over its new redistricting plans. A federal court drew new
congressional districts, and a state redistricting commission, with
a Republican majority, drew new state legislative districts. After
the 2002 election, Republicans won a clear majority in the state
legislature and reopened the redistricting issue by proposing a
new congressional plan that favored Republican candidates.
After an intense political struggle, the Texas legislature passed
a new congressional redistricting plan that helped Republicans
elect seven new members in the 2004 election.
Although redistricting GIS enabled Republicans to produce
this effective gerrymander, the ability to use GIS to customize
districts for each election is the most significant implication of
the new technology. Before the 1990s, states and parties main-
tained a redistricting infrastructure and staff for only 1 year,
once each decade. Two things changed in the 1990s, however.
First, the extensive litigation throughout the decade meant that
many states were forced to maintain a permanent redistricting
staff and infrastructure. In North Carolina, for example, the final
case from the 1990 round of redistricting was settled by the
Supreme Court in 2001, 3 weeks after the Census Bureau
released data for the 2000 round of redistricting (34).
Second, states and political parties no longer need to maintain
a separate redistricting staff, because they can apply the tech-
nical skills and computer technology associated with GIS to
many other areas of state administration and campaigns. By
giving states and parties the means to create political gerryman-
ders frequently, GIS increase the potential level of partisan
control over elections.
Institutional Practices of Redistricting GIS
Using GIS to increase partisan control is not surprising, because
parties have always sought such advantages. Yet even where
states use GIS to expand the representation of other interests,
bureaucratic and institutional practices may end up limiting,
rather than expanding, the kinds of representation possible in
GIS. The redesign of Texas’s redistricting GIS (called
REDAPPL, for redistricting application) undertaken by the
Texas Legislative Council (TLC) in the late 1990s illustrates this
point (2).§
A lawsuit in the 1990s overturned a number of congressional
districts in Texas as racial gerrymanders (35). As part of this
decision, the court ordered the state to include ‘‘communities of
interest’’ in REDAPPL to ensure they would not be broken up
among several districts. This was a particular challenge, because
the court provided little guidance for modifying the system.
Consequently, the TLC staff devoted a lot of attention to this
question and sought data that would reflect the multidimen-
sional complexity of ‘‘community.’’
Despite these good intentions, the data on communities of
interest that the TLC ultimately included in REDAPPLwere not
necessarily the ‘‘best’’ or most useful representations. Rather,
information was included because the TLC had access to it in
conventional digital form. The agency did not have the time or
resources to systematically collect original data and information
for the entire state, so they used data that were already available,
that were (in their view) relevant to redistricting, and that could
be easily imported into their system (2). Such processes are
fundamental to how bureaucratic practices shaped the repre-
sentation of community in the state’s GIS.
The exclusive use of digital information was an obvious
outcome of this process, but the further exclusive use of data
defining boundaries was a less obvious result. The TLC included
the boundaries of police beats, Justice of the Peace districts,
school districts, and the like. The agency considered, but did not
include, nonboundary data such as aerial photos and property
appraisal information (used to set tax rates). There were no
technical barriers to the inclusion of these data, but the agency
determined there would be little benefit to having them in
REDAPPL. Although such data might have relevance for
communities of interest, the staff thought such information
would not be especially useful in the process of drawing districts.
The TLC operationalized the legal rhetoric of the Vera
decision to define ‘‘communities of interest’’ in ways that re-
f lected both technical considerations and bureaucratic concerns
over time, cost, and resources. The agency used boundary data,
because they were easily available and because, in the view of the
agency, such data would be most helpful to the users of the
system. Boundary data, however, offer a thin conception of
community. Communities of propinquity are communities of
interest to the extent that they facilitate processes such as
day-to-day interactions, the formation of community groups, and
organizations of civil society. Particular boundaries neither
perfectly contain nor perfectly represent such processes. By
using boundaries as the sole representation of community, such
technical representations freeze and misrepresent these dynamic
practices.
These statements are not meant as criticisms of the TLC staff’s
professional judgment or practices. The Vera court’s language
assumed that ‘‘communities of interest’’ were objective knowable
objects that GIS could represent unproblematically. As this
example illustrates, however, such representations require sig-
nificant technical work and bureaucratic decision-making. The
ability to represent all possible ‘‘communities of interest’’ in all
possible ways is a Sisyphean task, because ‘‘community of
interest’’ is itself an imprecise concept, more useful for its
rhetorical power than for its ability to define the precise bound-
aries of election districts.
Communities of Interest and Political Competitiveness
The experience of Arizona in its 2001 redistricting also illustrates
how institutional solutions alone cannot overcome the contra-
dictions inherent in American practices of political representa-
tion. Like Texas, the IRC sought to incorporate ‘‘communities
of interest’’ into the redistricting process but unlike Texas, it
systematically solicited input at public hearings to define specific
communities. Unlike Texas, the IRC was also explicitly charged
with creating politically competitive districts. The contradictions
between representing communities of interest and creating
politically competitive districts were revealed when the commis-
sion’s districting plans were challenged in court (36).
Based on pubic testimony, the IRC identified 30 communi-
ties of interest and areas designated as Arizona Units of Rep-
resentation (AUR). AURs included, for example, Native Amer-
ican reservations, areas of Hispanic concentration, urban–rural
§The TLC is a nonpartisan state agency that provides various technical services to the state
legislature, including the maintenance and redesign of the REDAPPL system. The legisla-
ture, not the TLC, creates redistricting plans. Nothing in this article should be taken as a
criticism of the TLC’s highly professional and knowledgeable staff.


















divisions, and municipalities like the City of Scottsdale (36). The
IRC subsequently kept such communities and AURs within
district boundaries and tried to put similar groups together in the
same district.
The effort to place similar communities and Arizona Units of
Representation in districts, combined with the failure to em-
phasize political competitiveness, led to districts that had rela-
tively safe majorities for one party or the other. The court
identified this as a fatal f law in the redistricting process and
suggested that the IRC could have kept communities of interest
intact while simultaneously placing dissimilar communities
within the same district to enhance political competitiveness.
Despite any shortcomings in the IRC’s process, the principles
of creating politically competitive districts and respecting com-
munities of interest are typically in conflict. The former empha-
sizes the suppression of unique political interests, whereas the
latter accentuates their expression. Moreover, citizens typically
want to be in a district where they are in the majority or at least
part of a winning coalition. The winner-take-all system means
that voters in heterogeneous districts have a greater risk of voting
for a losing candidate. Hence, citizens may desire competitive
districts in general but quite rationally prefer to be in a district
with a majority of liked-minded voters.
The IRC’s innovative use of technology to solicit and represent
public testimony to identify communities of interest could not
overcome the inherent tension between Madisonian antifaction-
alism and community representation. It is possible to argue, as
the Court did, that the commission struck the wrong balance, but
these two principles can only be balanced, not reconciled. The
‘‘correct’’ equilibrium between these two principles is a matter of
political rather than scientific judgment.
Conclusion
The growing demographic diversity of the electorate, combined
with a trend toward political inclusiveness, reveals the tensions
among the principles of U.S. political representation. The use of
a district election system means that nearly half of the voters in
a jurisdiction may vote for a losing candidate. Attempts to
reconcile this ‘‘winner-take-all’’ system with efforts to increase
the political representation of racial minorities and other ‘‘com-
munities of interest’’ often produce results, such as ‘‘bizarre’’
nonwhite-majority districts, that offend other important Consti-
tutional and ethical principles. Moreover, the territorial election
system also gives political parties the incentive to create partisan
gerrymanders.
The use of GIS technology for political redistricting seemed to
offer a solution to these conflicts. By lowering the time, cost, and
effort associated with redistricting, GIS aided legal enforcement
of voting rights laws and opened the process, in principle, to a
greater variety of citizen and community groups. Moreover, the
ability of GIS to display and represent a greater variety of
information, such as the location of communities of interest,
offers the capacity to represent a greater variety of interests and
perspectives in redistricting.
Unfortunately, GIS technology has generally not fulfilled
these promises. First, the use of GIS tends to favor already
powerful institutions and organizations. This is especially evi-
dent in the way GIS have facilitated increasingly sophisticated
partisan gerrymanders. Second, bureaucratic and institutional
practices can limit the ability of GIS to provide alternate
representations of communities. Although one can conceive of
GIS with ‘‘better’’ or more complex representations of commu-
nity, the social routines associated with GIS mean that such
representations are often not developed in practice.
Limiting the use of redistricting GIS to professional nonpar-
tisan commissions may be better than allowing a political
free-for-all, where political parties have vastly more power,
expertise, and resources than citizens’ groups. The experience of
Arizona demonstrates, however, that even redistricting per-
formed with advanced technology in an ostensibly neutral man-
ner with explicit criteria can be problematic.
GIS have rationalized the redistricting process, but they have
not produced better democracy. Although technical and insti-
tutional reforms can prevent the worst gerrymandering abuses,
they cannot overcome the contradictions inherent in the Amer-
ican system of political representation. Sophisticated analytic
techniques and GIS technology allow us to understand and
predict electoral outcomes and effects with increasing precision.
Although they hold out the possibility of a more ‘‘representa-
tive’’ electoral system, these tools cannot create a consensus on
what ‘‘representative’’ should mean.
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